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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Tia Satcher was convicted of grand theft of lost property in
the form of a purse and a financial transaction card contained within that purse. As a
preliminary matter, Ms. Satcher asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support
the State's charge in this case. In addition, she asserts numerous other trial errors that,
individually and cumulatively, demonstrate that she did not receive a fair trial and
therefore, reversal of her conviction is required.
During her trial, the prosecutor was allowed to question - over Ms. Satcher's
repeated objections - a police officer multiple times about whether, in his training and
experience, he believed that Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of the
charged offense.

The district court was alerted to the improper nature of this

questioning, but ruled that it was admissible because the officer's opinion as to
Ms. Satcher's truthfulness would assist the jury as the trier of fact in this case. As a
component of this ruling, the district court also expressly ruled that it did not, and could
not, make a determination as to whether the detective was qualified to testify as an
expert at trial. The trial court did so because the court believed the jury had to make
this determination.
Ms. Satcher asserts that the district's erroneous admission of the testimony of a
police officer as to his opinion of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness and credibility was
reversible error.

She also asserts that the prosecutor in this case committed

misconduct when he deliberately questioned the police officer on these matters.
In addition, the district court admitted evidence of a restitution order from a prior
criminal case under the rubric of I.R.E. 609 - which only permits the introduction of
1

evidence of a prior felony criminal conviction, and only permits the introduction of such
evidence for matters of the general credibility of a witness. This prior restitution order
was not on its face evidence of a prior felony conviction, and was not admitted by the
district court to show anything related to Ms. Satcher's general credibility. The purpose
for which the court deemed the restitution order to be admissible was to show
Ms. Satcher's propensity. Because this restitution order was not admissible under the
rule relied upon by the district court, and was not admissible under the rules of evidence
for the purpose articulated by the court, admission of this evidence was reversible error.
Finally, Ms. Satcher asserts that even if the errors in her case were not deemed
to require reversal individually, the cumulative effect of these errors demonstrates that
she did not receive a fair trial. Accordingly, under the cumulative error doctrine, reversal
is required.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Tia Satcher was charged with grand theft of lost property in the form of a financial
transaction card.

(R., pp.33-34.)

This charge was based on the allegation that, on

December 24, 2008, Ms. Satcher had taken and used a credit card from the purse of a
woman, Danielle Ostolasa-Mendiola, who had forgotten to retrieve her purse from a
shopping cart and left the purse behind.

(Prelim. Tr. 1, p.6, L.11 -

p.11, L.8)

Ms. Satcher actually called Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola and informed her that Ms. Satcher
had found the purse with several items strewn about the parking lot beside it. (Prelim.
Tr., p.11, Ls.1-8.) Ms. Satcher was calling so that she could return the purse. (Prelim.
Tr., p.11, Ls.1-8.)

However, within minutes of this call, Ms. Ostolasa-lVlendiola was
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contacted by phone by a Boise police officer who informed her that he believed some
items from her purse had been taken.

(Prelim. Tr., p.12, L 11 - p.13, L. 14.) After

calling her credit card company, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola was told that one of her credit
cards had been used after she had left her purse behind in the shopping cart. (Prelim.
Tr., p.14, Ls.2-25.)
The State's first witness at trial was Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola.
Ls.8-11.)

(Trial Tr., p.176,

She testified that, on the day in question, she was shopping at a local

Walmart store, and that she was by herself. (Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.4-18.) According to
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's testimony, she placed her purse - which contained her wallet,
several credit cards, and checks - in the shopping cart. (Trial Tr., p.178, Ls.3-1 O; p.182,

L9 - p.183, L.18.) One of the credit cards in Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse was her
American Express card. (Trial Tr., p.183, Ls.14-18.)
After Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola finished making her purchases in the store at just
before noon, she pushed her cart out to the side of her car and spent several minutes
unloading her shopping bags into her car. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.3

p.179, L.1.) She did

not recall seeing her purse in the shopping cart when she finished unloading the cart.
(Trial Tr., p.180, L.4-p.181, L.16.) But Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola apparently believed that
she had already put her purse inside her car, because she got into her car and drove
home. (Trial Tr., p.181, L.17-p.182, L.8.)
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that, a couple of hours later, she received a
phone call from Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.2-25.) Ms. Satcher apparently told
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola that she had found Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse and wanted

1

Because there are multiple volumes of transcripts of proceedings in this case, for ease
of reference, citations to the transcript that are made herein are made in accordance
either with the date of the proceedings transcribed or with the nature of the proceeding.
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to return it to her.

(Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-5.)

According to Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola,

Ms. Satcher claimed during this conversation that the purse was left in a dumpster when
Ms. Satcher found it. (Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.1-9.) Ms. Satcher told Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola
that her purse still had her credit cards inside of it.

(Trial Tr., p.187, Ls.14-19.)

However, in the middle of this conversation, Ms. Satcher told Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola
that she had to get off the phone because she was being pulled over by police. (Trial
Tr., p.187, Ls.10-13.)
A short time later, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola was contacted by the police. (Trial Tr.,
p.188, Ls.9-12.) An officer met with her at a nearby gas station and returned her purse.
(Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.16-24.) Although the purse was not wet or damaged, Ms. OstolasaMendiola did testify that the purse, "smelled." (Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.6-7.)
Following her discussions with police, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that she
contacted her credit card companies to check for unauthorized charges and to cancel
the cards.

(Trial Tr., p.190, Ls.12-16.) There was one purchase that Ms. Ostolasa-

Mendiola asserted was unauthorized on her American Express card. (Trial Tr., p.190,
Ls.17-23.) The sole purchase was at a gas station for approximately $25. (Trial Tr.,
p.184, Ls.9-24.)

Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that she had not authorized

Ms. Satcher to make any purchases on her American Express card. (Trial Tr., p.184,
Ls.3-8.)
On cross-examination, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that she had misplaced
her purse on at least one prior occasion. (Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.5-10.) She also admitted
that she had no idea that her purse was left behind until she received the phone call
from Ms. Satcher hours later. (Trial Tr., p.199, Ls.5-8.) Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola had no
specific recollection about her purse following the time she made her purchases on that
4

day.

(Trial Tr., p.199, Ls.9-12.)

She also admitted to testifying at the preliminary

hearing that she had no idea whether or not her purse was still in the shopping cart at
the time she drove away from the store. (Trial Tr., p.207, L.22 - p.208, L.3.)
Curt Crum 2 also testified for the State. He clarified that, while he works for the
Boise Police Department, he is not actually a police officer. (Trial Tr., p.221, L.24 p.222, L.8.) Mr. Crum testified that, on December 24, 2008, he was working as the
head of the Crime Prevention Office, and that he was working in that capacity with local
merchants when his attention was drawn to Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., p.222, L.5 - p.223,
L.8.) Mr. Crum had no information regarding Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse at the time
that he began to follow the vehicle that Ms. Satcher was riding in. (Trial Tr., p.223, L.15
- p.224, L.6.)
Mr. Crum followed Ms. Satcher's vehicle from a mall parking lot to a nearby gas
station. (Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.11-22.) He was also accompanied by other officers while
tailing Ms. Satcher's van.

(Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.8-18.)

These other officers stopped

Ms. Satcher's van in the Walmart parking lot a short time after pulling out of the gas
station. (Trial Tr., p.230, L.19- p.231, L.11.) According to Mr. Crum's testimony, when
Ms. Satcher got out of the van, she made a statement regarding returning the purse.
(Trial Tr., p.231, L.22 - p.232, L.10.) Mr. Crum and the other officers questioned her
further about the purse, and eventually retrieved it from the van that Ms. Satcher was a
passenger in. (Trial Tr., p.232, L.14 - p.233, L.4.)
Following Mr. Crum's testimony, the State called Sergeant Dennis Tolan from the
Boise City Police Department to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.243, Ls.11-17.) Sergeant Tolan

2

While Mr. Crum appears to assist local merchants with investigations of suspected
thefts, the record in this case reflects that he is not actually a police officer and has
never been POST certified. (Trial Tr., p.161, Ls.7-11.)
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was the officer who initially pulled over the van that Ms. Satcher was a passenger in.
(Trial Tr., p.245, L.2 - p.246, L.8.) At the time he stopped the van, Sergeant Tolan was
unaware of anything involving Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's missing purse. (Trial Tr., p.247,
L.22 - p.248, L.1.) However, upon learning about the lost purse, Sergeant Tolan was
responsible for returning the purse to Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.248, Ls.1016.) After taking the purse directly to her, the officer stated that Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola
confirmed that all of the contents in her purse were present and intact. (Trial Tr., p.260,
L.19 - p.261, L.2.)
Following Sergeant Tolan's testimony, trial proceedings concluded on the first
day of trial. The State called another Boise City Police Officer, Detective Justin Kendall,
to the stand.

(Trial Tr., p.295, Ls.8-14.)

Detective Kendall was the officer who

interviewed Ms. Satcher regarding Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse once Ms. Satcher
was taken to the police station.

(Trial Tr., p.297, L.24 - p.296, L.18.) The detective

acknowledged that the only person seen in a surveillance photograph buying gas allegedly with Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card - was the driver of the van, Robert
Miner, who was not Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr., p.306, L.16 - p.311, L.5.)
After discussing some of Ms. Satcher's responses to questioning, including her
denial of having ever taken or used Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card that was
contained within the purse, the State switched gears to the officer's "expertise" in
detecting when people are lying. (Trial Tr., p.301, L.25- p.316, L.6.) Detective Kendall
testified that he observed several "cues" in Ms. Satcher's demeanor during questioning:
that she appeared to have become confrontational, she rubbed her arm, she touched
her ear, and she also touched her hair.

(Trial Tr., p.316, Ls.8-23.) According to the
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officer, he believed these to be signs of being nervous and "trying to be deceptive."
(Trial Tr., p.316, L.8- p.317, L.18.)
Not content to leave the officers testimony at the behavior that he observed on
Ms. Satcher's part during the interrogation, the prosecutor then asked the officer
directly, "Sir, based upon your training and experience as a detective in interrogation,
was Ms. Satcher being truthful?" (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.5-7.) Ms. Satcher immediately
objected to this question as invading the province of the jury and improperly calling
upon one witness to testify as to the credibility of another. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.8-11.)
The State responded that, as a trained officer, a police officer was entitled to provide an
expert opinion as to whether another witness was lying. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.13-19.)
The trial court, apparently believing there to be a difference between the two,
twice sought to clarify whether the State was asking for an opinion as to Ms. Satcher's
credibility, or was rather seeking to elicit testimony as to her truthfulness.
p.320, L.20 - p.321, L.9.)

(Trial Tr.,

When informed that the State was asking regarding

Ms. Satcher's truthfulness, the district court allowed the State to proceed so long as the
State established a "foundation" for this opinion. (Trial Tr., p.321, Ls.12-13.)
The State then engaged in the following exchange with Detective Kendall:
Q:

Detective, you talked about some of the training and experience
that you have in -- in performing interrogations in the years you've
been a detective. Based on that training and experience, were you
able to form an opinion as to whether Ms. Satcher was being
truthful to -- with you during the state -- with the statements
that she made to you during her interrogation with you?

A:

Yes, I was.

Q:

And did you form an opinion then?

A:

Yes

7

Q:

And Judge -- Detective Kendall, what was your opinion as to
whether Ms. Satcher was being truthful with you during the
interrogation?

(Trial Tr., p.321, L.15 - p.322, L.3 (emphasis added).)
Ms. Satcher again immediately objected prior to the officer's response.

As

before, she noted to the district court that such questions were plainly impermissible as
a comment on the credibility or truthfulness of another witness. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.614.)

The State responded that the jury could assess the credibility of the officer's

assessment of Ms. Satcher's credibility, and therefore there was no problem with the
question. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.16-22.) And the district court signed on to this rationale,
finding that whether or not to find the detective's assessment was credible was up to the
jury. (Trial Tr., p.322, Ls.23-25.) The court also found that this testimony about whether
Ms. Satcher was lying in her version of events, "may be helpful to the jury," and
therefore allowed Detective Kendall to respond. (Trial Tr., p.322, L.25 - p.323, L.10.)
The State then asked the question for a third time:
Q:

Detective, what -- what opinion did you form as to whether
Ms. Satcher was being truthful with you during the
interrogation?

A:

I did not feel she was being truthful.

(Trial Tr., p.323, Ls.12-14 (emphasis added).)
On cross-examination, Detective Kendall admitted that his custodial interrogation
of Ms. Satcher lasted five or six hours and that the detective had repeatedly stated that
he did not believe Ms. Satcher during this interview. (Trial Tr., p.324, L.14 - p.325, L.5.)
He also admitted that it is common for people who are accused of a crime to be nervous
in talking with police. (Trial Tr., p.327, Ls.13-20.) And it is also common for a person to
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be upset when they are accused of a crime that they did not commit. (Trial Tr., p.327,
Ls.17-20.)
However, when dealing with a related issue regarding whether Ms. Satcher was
permitted to question the police officer about how long the interrogation went on, the
district court was careful to note the fact that the court did not qualify Detective Kendall
as an expert. The court explained:
Let me be clear about -- I didn't certify anybody as an expert. The -the jury decides who's expert, who's not, whether to believe them
and what -- and who not to believe.

So I -- I never said to the jury, and don't intend to say to the jury, that
this person is an expert, or is any other person [sic]. Ultimately,
that's all jury material. They decide, they assess credibility or not.
But I do think that the officer's -- this witness' assessment of
whether or not the defendant was telling the truth to him on this
occasion was helpful to the jury and was -- is within the scope of his
training. It's up to the jury whether they -- to believe -- to be impressed
by his training, feeling that he's got some expertise or - and, ultimately,
his credibility. So, that was my intention and how I ruled there, and that's
my view of the law.

(Trial Tr., p.333, L.10 - p.334, L.6 (emphasis added).)
During a break in the detective's testimony, the parties then took up the issue of
whether Ms. Satcher could be impeached with two prior felony convictions if she were to
take the stand and testify at trial. (Trial Tr., p.351, L.13 - p.352, L.6.) The district court
ultimately ruled that the State could impeach Ms. Satcher with both prior alleged
felonies, but that the State could not inform the jury of the nature of the second felony an alleged conviction for grand theft out of Canyon County that also involved Mr. Miner
- due to the fact that the potential for prejudice of that information would substantially
outweigh any probative value. (Trial Tr., p.351, L.13 - p.358, L.9.)
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But the district court also ruled that the fact that Ms. Satcher had a restitution
order in common with Mr. Miner would be admissible into evidence if Ms. Satcher were
to take the stand and testify that she was unaware, in this case, of Mr. Miner's alleged
use of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card to buy gas.

(Trial Tr., p.358, L.25 p.370,

L.13) Ms. Satcher pointed out - multiple times - that the restitution order arising out of
the prior criminal case had nothing to do with the charges at issue in her current case,
and that a restitution order had no bearing on her credibility for impeachment purposes
under I.RE. 609.

(Trial Tr., p.361, Ls.21-22; p.362, Ls.1-3; p.365, L.1 - p.366, L.7)

Additionally, Ms. Satcher noted multiple times that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial
and had the potential for confusing the jury under I.R.E. 403. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.18-20;
p.363, Ls.2-1 O; p.364, Ls.19-22; p.366, Ls.2-7; p.369, L.14 - p.370, L.5.) Finally, she
noted that this evidence was irrelevant because there was no nexus or connection
between the prior alleged grand theft charge and her current alleged offense. (Trial Tr.,
p.364, Ls.19-22; p.365, Ls.1-4; p.366, L.25.)
However, the district court believed this evidence to be relevant in case
Ms. Satcher testified and, in doing so, attempted to distance herself from the actions of
Mr. Miner in allegedly using Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card to buy gas. (Trial Tr.,
p.361, L.23 - p.374, L.14.) The court found that such evidence "might be relevant" to
whether Ms. Satcher had knowledge that Mr. Miner might try to use a credit card in the
purse that was left behind by Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.370, Ls.6-13.)
Ms. Satcher thereafter returned to her cross-examination of Detective Kendall.
He admitted that there was no evidence at all that Ms. Satcher had ever used any of the
credit cards in Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse. (Trial Tr., p.380, Ls.12-14.) Following
the detective's testimony, the State rested its case. (Trial Tr., p.398, Ls.13-14.)
10

Ms. Satcher testified in her own defense at trial.

As a preliminary matter,

Ms. Satcher admitted both to the two felonies alleged by the State in support of its I.RE.
609 motion, as well as to the existence of a prior joint restitution order imposed on
herself and Mr. Miner. (Trial Tr., p.404, L.14 - p.405, L.9.) Ms. Satcher then turned to
her version of events regarding the alleged theft of the financial transaction card
contained within Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse.
According to Ms. Satcher's testimony, she found Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse
in a shopping cart that was adjacent to some recycling bins that looked very much like
trash bins in the Walmart parking lot. (Trial Tr., p.408, L.13 - p.409, L.22.) After seeing
no one else around who the purse might have belonged to, Ms. Satcher testified that
she took Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse into the Walmart store. (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.1225.) She talked to a clerk in the store about the lost purse. However, when she was
directed to leave the purse on a counter that appeared to be unattended and that was
surrounded by people, Ms. Satcher was concerned that this would not be a safe place
to leave the purse and so she instead took it with her outside. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.414.)
Instead of leaving the purse unattended on a store counter, Ms. Satcher went
outside to the parking lot and attempted to contact Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola on
Mr. Miner's phone.

(Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.12-22.)

She testified that she found

Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's phone number listed on one of the checks that was present in
the purse. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.23-25.) Although she tried twice to call Ms. OstolasaMendiola, nobody answered on her first two attempts to call. (Trial Tr., p.412, L.19 p.413, L.11.)
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Ms. Satcher admitted that the van in the surveillance photo showing an individual
purchasing gas was the same van that she was riding as a passenger in. (Trial Tr.,
p.413, Ls.19-24.) However, she asserted that Mr. Miner was driving the van, and she
could not see Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse in the van due to the fact that her dog - a
relatively large poodle - was positioned between herself and the purse that was next to
Mr. Miner. (Trial Tr., p.414, L.7 - p.417, L.21.) It was Mr. Miner that purchased gas at
the gas station following Ms. Satcher finding Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse. (Trial Tr.,
p.417, Ls.22-24.)

According to her testimony, Ms. Satcher and Mr. Miner did not

discuss in any way the source of the payment for the gas.

(Trial Tr., p.417, L.25 -

p.418, L.5.)
After getting gas, Ms. Satcher was finally able to get in touch with Ms. OstolasaMendiola on the phone in order to return her purse. (Trial Tr., p.418, L.24 - p.419, L.2.)
Ms. Satcher testified that she had no idea that there were any credit cards at all within
the purse until Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola asked about them and told Ms. Satcher where
the cards were contained inside of the purse. (Trial Tr., p.419, L.3 - p.420, L.4.) After
attempting to arrange to return the purse, Ms. Satcher's phone conversation with Ms.
Ostolasa-Mendiola was cut short when Mr. Miner was pulled over by police. (Trial Tr.,
p.420, L.8 - p.421, L.3.)
Following Ms. Satcher's testimony, the defense rested.

Following closing

arguments and the instructions provided by the court, the jury found Ms. Satcher guilty
of grand theft of stolen property. (Trial Tr., p.525, Ls.17-22; R., p.153.) Ms. Satcher
was sentenced to ten years, with two years fixed, and the district court retained
jurisdiction over Ms. Satcher's case. (Trial Tr., p.550, Ls.2-7; R., pp.157-159.) Prior to
the expiration of the district court's period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed her
12

on probation for ten years.

(4/18/11 Tr., p.19, L.16 - p.23, L.3; Order Suspending

Sentence and Order of Probation, Augment.)

Ms. Satcher timely appeals from her

judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., p.161.)
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ISSUES

1.

Was there insufficient evidence in this case to support the State's allegation of
grand theft of lost property in the form of a financial transaction card?

2.

Did the district court err when it permitted the State, over Ms. Satcher's objection,
to elicit testimony from a police officer as to his opinion of whether Ms. Satcher's
denial of guilt was truthful?

3.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct when he intentionally elicited testimony
from one witness regarding his opinion of Ms. Satcher's truthfulness in denying
guilt of the charged offense?

4.

Did the district court err when it admitted evidence in the form of a restitution
order under the auspices of I.R.E. 609 where the restitution order was not a
criminal conviction and was not admitted for any purpose related to Ms. Satcher's
credibility?

5.

Does the cumulative error doctrine require reversal in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Insufficient Evidence In This Case To Support Ms. Satcher's Conviction For
Grand Theft Of Lost Property In The Form Of A Financial Transaction Card

A.

Introduction
The evidence in this case is insufficient to support a substantial number of the

essential elements of the State's allegation of grand theft of lost property in the form of a
financial transaction card. In light of this, Ms. Satcher asserts that her conviction for this
offense must be reversed with prejudice.

B.

Standard of Review
The standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a conviction is whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial, competent
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510, 960 P.2d 190, 193
(Ct. App. 1998). This Court will not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of
the evidence where a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the
evidence for that of the jury. Id. All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
State. Id.

Further, matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the

testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within the
province of the jury. Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is
insufficient to support the conviction." State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 701, 946 P.2d
1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997).
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C.

There Was Insufficient Evidence In This Case To Support Ms. Satcher's
Conviction For Grand Theft Of Lost Property In The Form Of A Financial
Transaction Card
1.

There Was Insufficient Evidence In This Case To Support A Finding,
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Ms. Satcher Did Not Make
Reasonable Efforts To Return The Financial Transaction Card And The
Purse To Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola

The sole theory alleged for the theft charge in this case was that Ms. Satcher
committed theft by the appropriation of lost property.

(R., pp.33-34.)

One of the

essential elements for this offense is that the defendant failed to take "reasonable
measures to restore the property to the owner." I.C. § 18-2403(2)(c). Therefore, there
can be no criminal liability for theft regarding the failure to return lost property unless it is
determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant who found the property
failed to take reasonable measures to return the property to its true owner. See State v.
Evans, 119 Idaho 383, 386 (Ct. App. 1991 ).

The State presented no evidence to support such a finding and, in fact, all of the
evidence in this case demonstrates just the opposite - that Ms. Satcher did make
reasonable efforts to return Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's property to her.

Ms. Satcher

testified at trial as to the multiple efforts that she made in order to seek to return
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse, and all of its contents, to her.

First, Ms. Satcher

attempted to see if there was anyone else around who the purse may belong to when
she initially found the purse in the Walmart parking lot so that she could return the purse
to its owner. (Trial Tr., p.410, Ls.12-16.) When she didn't see anyone around who the
purse might belong to, Ms. Satcher then returned to the Wal mart store and attempted to
obtain assistance from an employee there. (Trial Tr., p.410, L.21-p.411, L.14.)
However, according to Ms. Satcher's testimony, she was merely directed by this
employee to abandon Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse on a counter that was not
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attended by anyone else at the time and where there were a lot of people crowded
around the area. (Trial Tr., p.411, Ls.4-14.) Because she felt it was wrong to leave the
purse unobseNed and unattended on the counter, Ms. Satcher then went outside to the
Walmart parking lot and tried unsuccessfully - twice - to call Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola on
Mr. Miner's phone after locating Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's phone number from a check
within the purse. (Trial Tr., p.411, L.12- p.413, L.9.)
On Ms. Satcher's third attempt, she was able to get in touch with Ms. OstolasaMendiola on the phone in order to return the purse.

(Trial Tr., p.413, Ls.10-24.)

Ms. Satcher told Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola her name, and that she found Ms. OstolasaMendiola's purse. (Trial Tr., p.419, Ls.3-7.) Ms. Satcher testified that she was originally
unaware that there were any credit cards in the purse, but that she confirmed for
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola on the phone that the credit cards were still in the purse when
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola told Ms. Satcher where in the purse the cards would be located.
(Trial Tr., p.419, Ls.15-19.)

Finally, Ms. Satcher was in the process of making

arrangements to return the purse to Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola at the time the van she was
riding in was pulled over by police. (Trial Tr., p.420, L.8 - p.421, L.3.)
None of the State's evidence in any way refuted Ms. Satcher's account of events.
To the contrary, the State's evidence actually corroborated several aspects of her
testimony.

Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola testified that Ms. Satcher actually did call her to

return the purse, and that this call was only about two hours after the purse was left
behind by Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola in the Walmart parking lot. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.2-13.)
She also confirmed Ms. Satcher's account that Ms. Satcher identified herself directly to
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola. (Trial Tr., p.186, Ls.24-25.) Just as Ms. Satcher had testified,
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola likewise testified that she had asked Ms. Satcher whether the
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credit cards were still inside the purse, which was confirmed by Ms. Satcher. (Trial Tr.,
p.187, Ls.14-19.)

Finally, her testimony further corroborated that Ms. Satcher

expressed the desire to return the lost purse and was trying to make arrangements to
do so when the phone call was cut short. (Trial Tr., p.187, L.25 - p.188, L.8.)
Even if the jury were to disregard Ms. Satcher's testimony in its entirety, the
testimony of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola, standing alone, demonstrates that Ms. Satcher
had actually made reasonable efforts to return the purse and its contents to its owner.
In light of this, the State presented not only insufficient evidence, but no evidence, upon
which to sustain the essential element that Ms. Satcher had failed to make reasonable
efforts to return the property to its owner.

2.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support A Finding, Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt, That Ms. Satcher Had The Requisite Intent To
Support The Charge Of Grand Theft In This Case At The Time Of The
Alleged Taking Of Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's Purse, Nor At Any Other Point
In Time

The underlying theft that Ms. Satcher was alleged to have committed has, as an
essential element, an intent requirement.

See I.C. § 18-2403.

This intent element

placed the burden on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Satcher
either had the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property alleged to have
been wrongfully taken, or had the intent to appropriate that property to the defendant or
a third person. Id.
With regard to allegations of theft offenses, the requisite intent must be proved to
exist at the time of the alleged taking - even evidence that the defendant subsequently
developed the required intent will not suffice. See, e.g., State v. Hopple, 83 Idaho 55,
60 (1960); State v. Huskinson, 71 Idaho 82, 87 (1952); State v. Riggs, 8 Idaho 630, 70
P. 947, 951 (1902). "The principle is well settled that the felonious intent must exist at
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the time of the taking." Hopple, 83 Idaho at 60. Ms. Satcher asserts that there was no
evidence that would support the intent element of the theft alleged in this case, and
therefore her conviction should be reversed with prejudice.
It is entirely undisputed in this case that the only evidence of appropriation or use
of one of the credit cards from Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse showed that it was
someone other than Ms. Satcher that used the card. (Trial Tr., p.306, L.16 - p.311,
L.5.) And it was Mr. Miner's appropriation that formed the basis of the State's allegation
that Ms. Satcher appropriated Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's financial transaction card for the
use of another. Under the case law, the State had the burden to show that Ms. Satcher
had the intent to appropriate the purse and its contents for Mr. Miner's use at the time of
the initial taking of the purse from the Walmart parking lot.

However, none of the

evidence in this case supports such an inference.
As was just noted, Ms. Satcher made extensive efforts from the moment she first
found the purse that was left behind in the parking lot in order to return the purse to its
owner. (Trial Tr., p.410, L.12 - p.421, L.3.) Much of Ms. Satcher's account of these
efforts was corroborated by Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola at trial.
p.188, L.8.)

(Trial Tr., p.186, L.2 -

The evidence at Ms. Satcher's trial demonstrates actions that are

fundamentally inconsistent with an individual harboring an intent to permanently deprive
the owner of the property, Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola, of her purse or her financial
transaction cards.
Additionally, the evidence at trial, which was not directly contradicted, was that
Ms. Satcher was entirely unaware that Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's purse contained any
financial transaction cards until speaking on the phone with her. (Trial Tr., p.419, L.15p.420, L.7.)

As such, Ms. Satcher could not have formed the specific intent to
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appropriate Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's financial transaction card for Mr. Miner's use at the
time of the alleged taking because Ms. Satcher did not have any awareness that there
were any credit cards in the purse until being informed of them by Ms. OstolasaMendiola.
A review of all of the evidence in this case shows that the State presented no
proof that Ms. Satcher harbored the intent to permanently deprive Ms. OstolasaMendiola of her purse or credit card at the time Ms. Satcher found the purse that was
left behind in the store parking lot. There was likewise no evidence that Ms. Satcher
had the intent to appropriate this purse or its contents for Mr. Miner's use when it was
found. As such, the State presented insufficient evidence to sustain the grand theft
conviction in this case.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State, Over Ms. Satcher's Objection, To
Elicit Testimony From A Police Officer As To His Opinion Of Whether Ms. Satcher's
Denial Of Guilt Was Truthful

A.

Introduction
The district court, over Ms. Satcher's objection, permitted one of the State's

witnesses to testify as to his opinion that Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of
the charged offense.

In doing so, the district court erroneously determined both that

such testimony was permissible, and that it would assist the jury in its ultimate
determination regarding the State's charge.

This was clear and reversible error,

especially in light of the fact that there was no direct evidence tying Ms. Satcher to any
use of the financial transaction card that was the subject of the State's grand theft
charge in this case.
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Moreover, the district court later clarified its belief that it was not permitted to
determine whether the testimony at issue - coming from Detective Kendall - was in the
form of expert testimony, and noted that the court never made a finding that the
detective was qualified to testify as an expert. Because this determination lies with the
district court - and not the jury, as the court appeared to believe - the court's refusal to
make this determination constituted an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard of Review
'The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence, and its decision to admit evidence will be reversed only where there has been
a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521
(2003). It is a matter of the discretion of the trial court to determine whether or not a
witness is properly qualified to present testimony as an expert in a particular case. Id.
This Court applies a three-part test with regard to the question of whether the district
court abused its discretion.

First, this Court examines whether the district court

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion.

Id.

Second, this Court reviews

whether the district court acted within the proper bounds of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards that are attendant on its determination. Id. Finally,
this Court must determine whether the district court reached its discretionary
determination through an exercise of reason. Where the defendant objects to the error
at issue on appeal, the State bears the burden of establishing that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Permitted The State. Over Ms. Satcher's
Objection. To Elicit Testimony From A Police Officer As To His Opinion Of
Whether Ms. Satcher's Denial Of Guilt Was Truthful
In this case, the district court expressly permitted one of the State's witnesses,

Detective Kendall, to testify directly as to his opinion of whether Ms. Satcher was being
truthful when she denied guilt of the charged offense in this case. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.5 p.323, L.15.) And the district court did so despite multiple objections by Ms. Satcher
that this testimony was an improper comment on credibility and that it invaded on the
province of the jury. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.8 - p.322, L.14.) The court's basis for doing so
was the trial court's erroneous belief that such testimony would "assist the trier of fact."
(Trial Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.10.) Ms. Satcher asserts that this ruling was a clear
abuse of discretion, both because the court's ruling is not in accord with clear legal
standards regarding such testimony and because the court's determination was not
reached in accordance with reason.
It is clear, black-letter law that one witness is not permitted to testify as to his or
her opinion as to the truthfulness or credibility of another witness, as this is a direct
invasion of the jury's function in determining credibility and further does not assist the
trier of fact. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 229; State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 468
(2007); Perry, 139 Idaho at 525; State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 768-769 (1993);
State v. Walters, 120 Idaho 46, 55 (1990); People v. Barnes, 2 Idaho 148, 150, 9 P.

532, 533 ( 1886).
Various formulations of this rule from prior case law have been set forth in the
Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in Perry:
Idaho courts have routinely held that "an expert's opinion, in a proper
case, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would
require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of
disputed evidence. To venture past that point, however, is to usurp the
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jury's function." "It is the jury's function to assess the demeanor of the
witnesses and make a determination of credibility ... This Court will not
second guess the jury's determination on credibility or the weight to be
given to the witnesses' testimony." "[S]tatements by a witness as to
whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited."
Perry, 139 Idaho at 525 (internal citations omitted).

In an unrelated Perry opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that this rule has
existed for over one hundred years, emerging from a time that predated actual
statehood in Idaho.

"The Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho stated over one-

hundred years ago, that a question calling "for the opinion of one witness as to the
truthfulness of another ... is clearly an invasion of the province of the jury, who are the
judges of the credibility of witnesses."
Barnes, 2 Idaho 148, 150 (1886)).

Perry, 150 Idaho at 229 (quoting People v.

The Court noted that, regardless of whether the

testimony regarding the truthfulness of another witness comes from a witness giving lay
testimony or one providing expert testimony, this type of testimony is always prohibited.
Id.

Ms. Satcher notes that even polygraph examinations, which appear to be based
on scientific metrics that are certainly more reliable than observations of fidgety
behavior such as scratching an arm or crossing one's legs or playing with one's hair
(relating the gestures that Detective Kendall relied upon in opining that Ms. Satcher was
not telling the truth), have been rejected as an appropriate subject matter upon which to
opine as to the truthfulness of a witness. See Perry, 139 Idaho at 522-525; see also
Trial Tr., p.316, L.19 - p.317, L.14 Notably, the Perry Court determined that testimony
purportedly based on the body's involuntary physiological responses to questioning in
order to establish truthfulness is not helpful to the jury in determining material issues of
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fact. This type of evidence merely serves to bolster issues of credibility - an area that
the jury has the sole province to determine. Id. at 525.
This issue was addressed more squarely in the Christiansen opinion, which dealt
with testimony from an officer as to the body language of the defendant that indicated
deception.

This testimony was deemed, in and of itself, to be improper because it

suggested or inferred an opinion as to the defendant's ultimate veracity. 3

See

Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 467-468. The testimony of the officer in Christiansen, as set

forth in the opinion, is virtually identical in nearly every aspect to that presented by
Detective Kendall in this case in support of his testimony that Ms. Satcher was lying
when she denied guilt.

Id. at 468; compare with Trial Tr., p.316, L.1 - p.317, L.18.

Notably, the officer in Christiansen - unlike Detective Kendall in this case - was not
permitted by the trial court to answer directly the question as to whether he believed the
defendant was lying or to the specific things the officer noted about the defendant's
behavior during the interview with police. Id. Despite this, the Christiansen Court held
that the evidence presented was clearly an impermissible comment on the defendant's
veracity. Id. at 468-469. The Court held:

3

The issue of the prosecutor's improper questions regarding a police officer's opinion
as to the defendant's veracity was addressed in Christiansen within the context of the
defendant's motion for a new trial. Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 467-469. While the
Christiansen Court did not find that the defendant had established error in the denial of
this motion for a new trial, it was not because the Court found that the prosecutor's
questioning was in any way proper. Rather, the Court's holding regarding the denial of
the motion for a new trial was based on the fact that the record in Christiansen revealed
nothing to indicate that the trial court could have anticipated the improper questioning by
the State. Id. at 469. This stands in stark contrast to this case, where the trial court not
only was well aware that the State was attempted to elicit the improper testimony at
issue, but was further alerted specifically to the impropriety of the testimony and
specifically ruled on the issue. (Trial Tr., p.320, L.5 - p.323, L.15.)
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It makes no difference whether the opinion as to veracity is based upon
polygraph results or upon observations of body language. In both cases it
invades upon the province of the jury.
Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469.
In light of the foregoing cases, Ms. Satcher asserts that the district court's ruling
permitting this questioning was plainly erroneous.
In this case, following his testimony regarding certain physical acts and
demeanors of Ms. Satcher's that the officer thought were consistent with deception, the
prosecutor in this case asked Detective Kendall, "Sir, based on your training and
experience as a detective in interrogations, was Ms. Satcher being truthful?" (Trial
Tr., p.320, Ls.5-7 (emphasis added)).

Ms. Satcher immediately objected as to this

comment on credibility and its invasion on the jury's province. (Trial Tr., p.320, Ls.811.) The district court, apparently in the belief that there was a distinction between the
two, attempted to clarify from the State as to whether they were asking the witness for
an opinion about Ms. Satcher's truthfulness, or were rather asking about her credibility.
(Trial Tr., p.320, L.20 - p.321, L.9.)
The State was then permitted to rephrase and ask this same question a second
time in front of the jury - and Ms. Satcher once again objected on the same grounds.
(Trial Tr., p.321, L.15 - p.322, L.14.)

At this point, the district court ruled that the

officer's opinion about whether Ms. Satcher was truthful in her account of events to
police was helpful to the jury and was an appropriate subject for the State's questioning.
(Trial Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.10.)

Thereafter, the State was allowed to ask the

detective a third time whether he had an opinion as to Ms. Satcher's truthfulness, and
what that opinion was:
Q:

Detective, what -- what opinion did you form as to whether
Ms. Satcher was being truthful with you during the interrogation?
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A:

I did not feel she was being truthful.

(Trial Tr., p.323, Ls.12-15.)
The district court's determination to permit Detective Kendall to testify as to his
opinion that Ms. Satcher was not being truthful when she denied guilt or involvement in
the charged offense - and the court's finding that such testimony would assist the jury in
this case - was error of the plainest sort. Moreover, this error cannot be said to be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The State had no direct evidence that

Ms. Satcher was even aware that there were any credit cards in Ms. OstolasaMendiola's purse - much less that she had any knowledge of Mr. Miner's alleged use of
this card, and certainly not that she intended to appropriate the financial transaction
card for his use.
The only evidence presented at all as to what happened with Ms. OstolasaMendiola's purse after it was discovered by Ms. Satcher came from Ms. Satcher herself.
None of the State's evidence directly refuted her account of events.

As such, the

primary basis upon which the State gave the jurors any ground to disregard
Ms. Satcher's testimony was the testimony of Detective Kendall that, in his expert
opinion, she was lying in this version of events. Because this is the primary evidentiary
basis set forth by the State for refuting Ms. Satcher's account of the facts, the erroneous
admission of this evidence cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

D.

The District Court Erred When It Expressly Declined To Determine Whether
Detective Kendall Qualified As An Expert Witness, For Purposes Of Both I.R.E.
701 And I.R.E. 702, Prior To Permitting The Detective To Present Unqualified
Opinion Testimony To The Jury
As an additional matter, the district court in this case expressly stated - twice -

that it lacked the discretion to determine whether Detective Kendall was sufficiently
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qualified to present expert testimony in Ms. Satcher's criminal case.

Ms. Satcher

asserts that this is yet another evidentiary error and abuse of discretion.

Under the

rules of evidence, lay witnesses may only testify as to certain matters at trial, and
experts are permitted to testify as to other issues. Because the trial court is directly
tasked with determining whether testimony has a sufficient foundation to qualify as
expert testimony, the district court abused its discretion when the court found that it was
outside the role of the trial court to make a determination as to whether a witness may
testify as an expert.
The district court in this case twice expressly disavowed both that it had found
Detective Kendall qualified to present expert testimony to the jury and that it was within
the district court's proper role and discretion to do so.

In ruling on Ms. Satcher's

objection to the detective's opinion testimony as to her truthfulness, the district court
held that, "it's going to be up to the jury whether this witness is an expert." (Trial Tr.,
p.323, Ls.5-6.) The district court's failure to recognize that it had the discretion - and
the obligation - to make the determination as to whether a witness is qualified to
present expert testimony was further apparent at a later point in the proceedings:
Let me be clear about -- I didn't certify anybody as an expert. The -- the
jury decides who's expert, who's not, whether to believe them and what -and who not to believe.

So I -- I never said to the jury, and don't intend to say to the jury, that this
person is an expert, or is any other person [sic]. Ultimately, that's all jury
material. They decide, they assess credibility or not. But I do think that
the officer's -- this witness' assessment of whether or not the defendant
was telling the truth to him on this occasion was helpful to the jury, and
was -- is within the scope of his training. It's up to the jury whether they -to believe -- to be impressed by his training, feeling he's got some
expertise or -- and, ultimately, his credibility. So, that was my intention
and how I ruled there, and that's my view of the law.
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(Trial Tr., p.333, L.10 - p.334, L.6.)
Underpinning the district court's rationale for why the court did not believe that it
had the authority to determine whether a witness qualified as an expert for purposes of
determining the admissibility of evidence appears to be confusion between such a
determination and the jury's power to assess the credibility of the evidence. However, it
is not only within the court's discretion, but it is the trial court's obligation, to determine
whether a witness is qualified to give expert testimony under the evidentiary rules.
Because the district court failed to recognize this issue as being one within its
discretion, and expressly disavowed making any finding that Detective Kendall was
qualified to give any expert opinion testimony, Ms. Satcher asserts an additional abuse
of discretion in the admission of the officer's testimony.
The issue of whether a witness should be permitted to give expert testimony is
committed to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho
410, 413-414 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether a witness has been properly qualified as an
expert is a threshold matter for the trial court's determination in part because, under the
rules of evidence, there are different matters to which a lay witness and an expert
witness may testify and different standards that govern what the basis of that testimony
may be.

See Konechny, 134 Idaho at 414; State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 855

(Ct. App. 1991 ); I.R.E. 701, 702. Additionally, this determination must be made by the
district court before allowing any purported expert testimony to be admitted into
evidence before the jury.

State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 855 (1992); Johnson, 119

Idaho at 855.
The district court in this case - by its own account - refused to make a
determination as to whether Detective Kendall was qualified to render expert opinion
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testimony at trial, largely because the trial court appears not to have realized that it was
a matter of the court's discretion to do so. As such, admission of any expert opinion
testimony from the detective was improper in this case.

111.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Intentionally Elicited Testimony From
One Witness Regarding His Opinion Of Ms. Satcher's Truthfulness In Denying Guilt Of
The Charged Offense

A.

Introduction
The prosecutor in this case intentionally elicited improper opinion testimony from

Detective Kendall regarding his opinion as to whether Ms. Satcher was being truthful
when she denied involvement in the alleged theft in this case. The prosecutor persisted
in this line of questioning even after being put on notice by Ms. Satcher that this type of
questioning was plainly improper. Because Ms. Satcher's veracity was potentially the
most critical issue for the jury in adjudicating this case, the plainly improper actions of
the prosecutor in this case cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be harmless.

B.

Standard of Review
For alleged acts of misconduct followed by a contemporaneous objection, this

Court must make two determinations: first, whether misconduct occurred; and, second,
whether this misconduct was harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 220. However, the State
bears the burden of showing to the reviewing court, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
misconduct did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Id. at 228.
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C.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Intentionally Elicited Testimony
From One Witness Regarding His Opinion Of Ms. Satcher's Truthfulness In
Denying Guilt Of The Charged Offense
As has been noted, it is plainly improper to elicit testimony from one witness

asking for any opinion as to the truthfulness or veracity of another witness. See Point
ll(C) supra. In addition to being an evidentiary error, the elicitation of such testimony by
a prosecutor also constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.
Numerous decisions have made abundantly clear that it is misconduct for a
prosecutor to elicit testimony from a witness expressing an opinion as to the truthfulness
or credibility of another witness. See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; Christiansen, 144
Idaho at 468-469; see also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011) (finding that,
where State officer testifies as to improper opinion testimony at trial, Court would have
found prosecutorial misconduct had misconduct been alleged in addition to evidentiary
error).
The prosecutor in this case asked Detective Kendall three times whether he
believed, based upon his training and expertise, that Ms. Satcher was lying during the
police interrogation in which she denied guilt of the charged offense. (Trial Tr., p.320,
Ls.5-7; p.321, Ls.15-25; p.323, Ls.12-15.)

The detective was actually permitted to

answer this question the final time it was posed by the prosecutor in this case. (Trial
Tr., p.322, L.23 - p.323, L.15.)

Ms. Satcher submits that it constituted reversible

misconduct for the prosecutor to question the detective on these matters each time the
question was posed by the State.
The Christiansen Opinion makes clear that even testimony that falls short of that
elicited in this case - which directly called upon Detective Kendall to give an opinion as
to whether Ms. Satcher was lying when she denied guilt of the charged offense 30

constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.

The testimony at issue in Christiansen is

strikingly similar to earlier testimony provided by Detective Kendall in this case, which
listed various physical tics or actions as being indicators of deception.
144 Idaho at 468.

Christiansen,

The Court in Christiansen held that this type of questioning was

"clearly improper," because the officer's opinion as to the defendant's veracity, "was
clearly inadmissible." Id. The Christiansen Court further elaborated on the fact that the
elicitation of this testimony constituted misconduct:
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant
has a fair trial, and nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the
jury." They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they
can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they
transgress upon the rights of the accused." Prosecutorial misconduct
includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the question
asked.
Id. at 469.
The misconduct in this case was not harmless, for the reasons previously
articulated regarding the court's erroneous introduction of this evidence. See Point ll(C)
supra.

It is also noteworthy in this case that, even though the detective was only

permitted to answer the question once, the prosecutor was allowed to ask the question
of whether the detective believed that Ms. Satcher was being truthful three times. (Trial
Tr., p.320, L.5 - p.323, L.15.) As noted by the Court in Christiansen, even the act of
posing the question where the answer is inadmissible constitutes misconduct where the
jury can infer the answer from the question asked.

Christiansen, 144 Idaho at 469.

Therefore, each of the State's repeated iterations of this same improper question calling
for an opinion as to veracity constituted a separate act of misconduct, each of which
prejudiced Ms. Satcher in this case.
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IV.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence In The Form Of A Restitution Order
Under The Auspices Of l.R.E. 609 Where The Restitution Order Was Not A Criminal
Conviction And Was Not Admitted For Any Purpose Related To Ms. Satcher's
Credibility

A.

Introduction
The district court in this case, under the auspices of I.R.E. 609, ruled that

evidence of a fact other than a criminal conviction would be admissible for a purpose

other than her credibility if she testified that she was not involved in the use of the
financial transaction card at issue in this case. Specifically, the district court ruled that a
restitution order from a prior grand theft case that was ordered to be joint and several
with Mr. Miner would be admissible under I.R.E. 609 to show Ms. Satcher might have
known, "that maybe [Mr. Miner] would use the card that she had just taken," if
Ms. Satcher testified that she was not aware of or involved ln Mr. Miner's alleged use of
Ms. Ostolasa-Mendiola's credit card. This type of evidence is plainly outside the scope
of admissible evidence under I.R.E. 609, and is further inadmissible evidence for the
purpose identified by the district court

to show Ms. Satcher's propensity to commit

similar offenses.

8.

Standard of Review
As previously noted, the decision as to whether to admit or exclude evidence is

generally reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. Perry, 139 Idaho at 52.
Additionally, where, as here, the defendant objects to the error at issue on appeal, the
State bears the burden of establishing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Admitted Evidence In The Form Of A Restitution
Order Under The Auspices Of I.R.E. 609 Where The Restitution Order Was Not
A Criminal Conviction And Was Not Admitted For Any Purpose Related To Ms.
Satcher's Credibility
1.

The District Court Erred When It Ruled That The State Would Be
Permitted To Introduce Evidence Of A Prior Joint Restitution Order
Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Under I.R.E. 609 Because The
Restitution Order Was Not A Criminal Conviction, And Therefore Was Not
Admissible Under This Rule, And Because This Restitution Order Was
Only Deemed Admissible For A Purpose Unrelated To Ms. Satcher
General Credibility As A Witness

The district court in Ms. Satcher's case ruled that evidence of a restitution order
from a prior criminal case, that created joint and several liability between Ms. Satcher
and Mr. Miner, could come in under I.R.E. 609 in order to show that Ms. Satcher might
have known, "that maybe [Mr. Miner] would use the card that she had just taken." (Trial
Tr., p.358, L.25 - p.370, L.11.) Despite Ms. Satcher's multiple objections to admitting
this evidence, the court nevertheless persisted in its determination of admissibility under
I.R.E. 609. (Trial Tr., p.358, L.25 - p.373, L.9.)

Ms. Satcher asserts that this was an

abuse of discretion.
Under the plain language of I.R.E. 609, there are two conditional prerequisites to
the admission of impeachment evidence under this rule: the evidence being used to
impeach the witness must be evidence of a prior felony conviction and that evidence
must be admitted for its relevance to the issue of the general credibility of the witness.
See, e.g., I.R.E. 609; State v. Franco, 128 Idaho 815, 817-818 (Ct. App. 1996). Neither
of these prerequisites was met in the district court's order in this case.
As a threshold matter, a restitution order is not a criminal conviction. This much
was noted by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 834 (Ct.
App. 2010).

In fact, the court in Mosqueda went so far as to hold that restitution

proceedings are civil proceedings that are, "distinct from the criminal case." Id. As
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previously noted, I.R.E. 609 only operates to render prior felony convictions admissible
for impeachment purposes. And Ms. Satcher specifically drew to the court's attention
the fact that the evidence at issue was evidence of a restitution order, which was not a
prior conviction for purposes of admissibility under I.R.E. 609. (Trial Tr., p.367, Ls.5-8.)
Because the restitution order that was previously ordered jointly against Ms. Satcher
and Mr. Miner was not a prior felony conviction, it could not have been admissible under
this rule.
In addition, admission of this evidence under I.R.E. 609 was error because the
rationale for its admissibility by the district court was for a basis other than Ms. Satcher's
general credibility. The district court found this evidence to be admissible to show that
Ms. Satcher might have known, "that maybe [IVlr. Miner] would use the card that she
had just taken." (Trial Tr., p.358, L.25 - p.370, L.11.) This is not a permissible basis for
admissibility under I.R.E. 609.
The Idaho Supreme Court made this clear in its opinion in State v. Fernandez,
which dealt with a related question of the admissibility of evidence for purposes of
impeachment under I.R.E. 608.

See State v. Fernandez, 124 Idaho 381, 383-384

(1993). There, the Court found that the specific conduct at issue - an alleged prior drug
transaction - was not, in and of itself, probative of issues regarding credibility. Id. at
383.

In the same way, evidence that Ms. Satcher had a restitution order in common

with IVlr. Miner does not, in and of itself, have any relevance to issues of credibility at all.
The only function the introduction of this evidence served at trial was to place in the
minds of the jurors the insinuation that Ms. Satcher had done something criminal in the
past in conjunction with Mr. Miner.

In other words, the only real function of this
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evidence was to suggest Ms. Satcher's propensity to engage in criminal conduct with
Mr. Miner.
Further, the State cannot demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that this error
was harmless.

The opinion of the Court in Fernandez is likewise instructive on this

point. Where the evidence that was erroneously admitted carried with it the likelihood
that the jury would infer the defendant's criminal propensity from that evidence, a
reviewing court cannot declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such error is harmless.
Fernandez, 124 Idaho at 383-384. In light of this prejudice, the Court in Fernandez held
that erroneous admission of the evidence required reversal. Id. This Court should do
the same.

2.

The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of A Prior Restitution Order
Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Because This Evidence Was
Irrelevant To The Charges In Her Criminal Case

In asserting that the restitution order from the prior criminal case should not be
admitted, Ms. Satcher expressly objected to this evidence as being irrelevant to her
current charge, asserting, "That's got nothing to do with this case, Judge." (Trial Tr.,
p.361, Ls.21-22; p.365, Ls.1-1 O; p.366, Ls.21-25.)
The general rule is that relevant evidence is admissible, and evidence that is not
relevant is not admissible. See 1.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency
to make any fact that is of consequence to the issues at trial more or less probable.
l.R.E. 401. However, an exception to this general rule emerges when the sole basis
upon which any relevance of the evidence may be predicated is the criminal propensity
of the defendant.

Such proof cannot provide the basis for finding that evidence is

relevant, and therefore admissible, at trial. See State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009).
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As is discussed more fully below, the only theory of relevance behind the district
court's rationale for introducing evidence of Ms. Satcher's prior restitution order
expressly embraces an improper inference of propensity.

Without the inference of

criminal propensity, there is simply no relevance of a restitution order from another case
to the disputed issues regarding Ms. Satcher's theft charge. Because this evidence was
not relevant to the issues in Ms. Satchr's trial, this evidence should not have been
admitted under 1.R.E. 402.

3.

The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of A Prior Restitution Order
Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Because This Evidence, Admitted
For The Purpose Of Showing That Ms. Satcher Should Have Known That
Mr. Miner Would Appropriate IVls. Ostolasa-Mendiola's Financial
Transaction Card To His Own Use, Was Impermissible Propensity
Evidence As Prohibited Under I.R.E. 404(b)

Among the reasons for Ms. Satcher's multiple objections to the admission of
evidence of the prior restitution order was that this evidence related to conduct so
similar that alleged in her charged offense that it would violate her right to a fair trial to
admit the evidence. (Trial Tr., p.363, Ls.2-10.) A review of the district court's rationale
for admission of the disputed evidence reveals this objection to be well-founded.
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is generally inadmissible in order to
show criminal propensity or guilt of the crime charged. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Grist, 147
Idaho 49, 52 (2009); State v. Naranjo,_ P.3d _,_Idaho_, 2011 WL 2937162,
*3, *7 (Ct. App. 2011)4; State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 34 (Ct. App. 1988). However, this
appears to be precisely the rationale embraced by the district court when it determined
that evidence of Ms. Satcher's prior restitution order was admissible.

4

The Court of Appeals' opinion in Naranjo has not yet been released for publication in
the permanent law reports, and is therefore subject to revision or withdrawal.
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In finding that the prior restitution order, entered jointly against Ms. Satcher and
Mr. Miner, was admissible to show the possibility that Ms. Satcher could have inferred,
"that maybe [Mr. Miner] would use the card that she had just taken," the district court
was doing nothing more than placing before the jury evidence of Ms. Satcher's
propensity to engage in criminal activity with Mr. Miner. The sole inference to support
the district court's purported theory of relevance can be stated as follows - Ms. Satcher
committed a criminal offense jointly with Mr. Miner before, and therefore it is more likely
that she did so in this case. Such an inference is plainly improper.
The district court found that evidence of the prior restitution order entered jointly
against Ms. Satcher and Mr. Miner was admissible for a purpose that is not permitted
under the evidentiary rules. 5 Accordingly, the admission of this evidence by the court
was error.

4.

The District Court Erred In Admitting Evidence Of The Prior Restitution
Order Between Ms. Satcher And Mr. Miner Because The Potential For
Prejudice Of This Evidence Greatly Outweighed Any Probative Value
Under I.R.E. 403 And 609

Additionally, Ms. Satcher repeatedly objected to the admission of evidence
regarding the prior restitution order for which she was jointly liable with Mr. Miner on the
grounds that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial and had substantial potential to
confuse the jury regarding the issues at trial. (Trial Tr., p.362, Ls.18-20; p.363, Ls.2-1 O;
p.364, Ls.19-22; p.365, Ls.1-19; 368, Ls.1-6; p.369, L.14- p.370, L.370.)
Under both l.R.E. 403 and I.R.E. 609, the district court must weigh whether the
potential for prejudice of the evidence substantially outweighs its probative value in

5

As an additional matter, the prior restitution order entered against Ms. Satcher would
not have been admissible under I.R.E. 404(b) as the State never provided any notice at
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determining whether that evidence should be admitted at trial. See I.R.E. 403, I.R.E.
609; Franco, 128 Idaho at 818.
As has been noted, the evidence of Ms. Satcher's prior restitution order had no
relevance at all to the material issues at her trial.

Therefore, there was no

probativeness to this evidence with regard to the material issues in Ms. Satcher's trial.
Additionally, in light of the likelihood that the jury would infer criminal propensity from
this evidence, the potential for prejudice was very high. In light of this, error for the
district court to admit evidence of the prior restitution order in this case because the
potential for prejudice of this evidence substantially outweighed any probative value.

V.

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Requires Reversal In This Case
Ms. Satcher asserts that each of the trial errors at issue in this appeal, standing
alone, warrant reversal in this case. But even assuming that this Court determines that
none of the errors individually warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of these errors
deprived Ms. Satcher of her due process right to a fair trial and therefore reversal is
required.
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at
230. In this case, there were multiple errors occurring at trial, each one impacting on
Ms. Satcher's right to a fair trial. Given the existence of so many trial errors, the fact
that each of the above-noted errors had substantial impact on Ms. Satcher's due
process right to fairness in her criminal proceedings, and the overall weakness of the

all of its intent to introduce this evidence at trial. See State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225,
229-230 (2008).
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State's evidence in this case, Ms. Satcher asserts that the cumulative effect of the
errors in her case require reversal of her conviction.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Satcher respectfully requests that this Court reverse her conviction for grand
theft with prejudice in light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to support this
charge. In the alternative, Ms. Satcher respectfully requests that this Court reverse her
judgment of conviction and sentence for grand theft and remand this case for further
proceedings.
DATED this 20 th day of October, 2011.
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SARAH E. TOMPKINS',
i
Deputy State Appellate f}Ot>lic Defender
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